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Threat landscape



Ransomware attacks continued to be the preferred method of attack in 2022 (Forbes, 2022).

435% increase in such attacks in 2020 alone (WEF Global Risks Report, 2022).

Cybersecurity failure now frequently ranks as a top-five risk in East Asia and the Pacific as well as in Europe.

Four countries—Australia, Great Britain, Ireland, and New Zealand— ranked these attacks as their number one risk.

\$10T Global Cybercrime Damage Predicted by 2025.

Forbes (2022). Alarming Cyber Statistics For Mid-Year 2022 That You Need To Know. https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2022/06/03/ alarming-cyber-statistics-for-mid-year-2022-that-you-need-to-know/? sh=5e343ee77864

WEF (2022). The Global Risks Report 2022, 17th Edition. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2022.pdf UK Cybersecurity Breaches Survey (2020).

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/893399/Cyber_Security Breaches Survey 2020 Statistical Release 180620.pdf





RISCS held an online policy workshop on 2nd December 2021 with 33 participants from Government, academia, and the wider community as part of the RISCS Cybercrime theme led by Dr Maria Bada.

What can we do to improve resilience to ransomware?

Context

Whilst ransomware isn't a new problem, criminals have exploited the COVID-19 pandemic, which offered more opportunities and left people and organisations more vulnerable to ransomware. For example, the requirement to work from home left organisations with less oversight over where their assets and vulnerabilities are (such as people using personal devices or home routers). There were also attacks on many public sector organisations, including the University of Oxford while it was working on COVID-19 vaccine research.²

The aim of this workshop was to establish the latest thinking amongst the cybercrime community on understanding the scale of the ransomware problem, preventing and mitigating ransomware attacks, and to understand gaps in knowledge where further research is needed. This report summarises the discussions from the workshop and highlights possible research questions to explore that were identified during this session. We invite members of the RISCS community to consider taking forward research to address these gaps and would be happy to discuss opportunities for collaboration on any of them.

Key Points

- A better understanding of perpetrators could help prevent and improve recovery from ransomware attacks. Attackers possess a range of motivations and adopt different specialisms and tactics.
- Current under-reporting limits our ability to analyse and investigate the scale and implications of ransonware attacks.
 Ransomware victims may not understand why or how to report, or they might not feel incentivised to do so.
- The social impacts of ransomware are considerable but poorly understood. Tracking these can be challenging as surveys struggle to keep up with the pace of change in
- Phishing is the main vector for ransomware.
 It is unsurprising that organisations struggle to repel attacks that arise from employees opening malicious links or attachments in emails.
- SMEs are likely to have a lower availability of expertise and support than larger organisation. For example, IT asset management (including traditional PCs and servers, or cloud-based databases) is too expensive for SMEs and the use of personal devices for work makes this more difficult.
- Organisations don't always connect business continuity and cybersecurity - i.e. business critical systems could be severely disrupted should a ransomware attack occur. In cases where organisations rely on outsourcing of software and IT infrastructures, their recovery may be out of their control entirely.
- There is a limited time window to investigate the cause of an attack, which needs to be balanced with undertaking the recovery process.

#RISCS Research Institute for Sociotechnical Cyber Security

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RISCS, 2021. Remote working and (In) Security: https://www.riscs.org.uk/new-publication-remote-working-and-insecurity/

² NCSC Annual Report 2021: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ collection/ncsc-annual-review-2021/resilience/ncscresponse-to-covid

Improving the UK's resilience to ransomware (December 2021)

AIM:

- To establish the latest thinking & practices around ransomware attacks.
- b) Identify further research needs to inform new policy responses and/or change how organisations prevent and mitigate ransomware attacks.
- Workshop: 33 participants (Government, academia, business and the wider community).
- Online survey: 28 participants (SMEs)

Biggest challenge for an organisation being resilient to ransomware

delivery mechanism

User training

Incomplete adherence working remotely falling foulsocially engineered

home internet

malicious websites human User People weakest link

global network **System**

day job

Small team

migration and data

held locally staff and users

Main other challenge

Measures taken to prevent ransomware

malware solutions security controls security job **Security awareness** cyber security box solutions security event malware protection solutions protection culture

endpoint protection **Security via our IT provider**

security services Firewalls ransomware network and infrastructure security architecture

business continuity recovery/restoration

recovery plan

automatic updates continuity planning impact mitigation

backups recovery data storage

ransomware disaster recovery backups solutions critical accounts incident management culture change

Regular backups materialising recovery planning information exchanges planning and processes

1st step in mitigating ransomware attacks

ransomware attack

Shutdown our IT Systems

network step

attack

spread of the malware

systems Isolate data subjects

cyber specialists

mitigation process

isolate infections

soc report isolation

data

potential spread **Containment**

Isolate the attack **Containment / isolation** isolation and containment

Communication Strategy

senior management Management Team **Security officer Director of Operations**

Security

Technical team

ciso team

parts


Operations / Security Teams

information infrastructure

Director Crisis Management

Security Operations

Reporting a Ransomware Attack to the Police



To Pay or Not to Pay



- The risk management and leadership teams face a critical decision: Should we pay the ransom?
- Several factors should go into this decision:
 - the criticality of affected data and systems,
 - availability and integrity of data backups,
 - cost of the ransom versus the estimated cost of restoration,
 - the likelihood of successful restoration (whether the ransom is paid or not),
 - and regulatory implications

Identifying Key Gaps on Ransomware



Defending Against Ransomware Attacks

Ensure you have antivirus and firewall installed on all endpoints within the organization

Backup your data

Restrict admin rights on endpoints

Keep commonly exploited third-party applications updated

Run a risk assessment

Invest in auditing & monitoring

Invest in cybersecurity awareness training tools for employees

Recommendations

Organisational factors and decision-making processes within organisations

Resource allocation in cybersecurity

Security or privacy and data protection considerations by design

The human factor

Cybersecurity awareness raising initiatives at all levels





Participants

A total of 36 participants took part in this study. Interviews were conducted with representatives from: **Public sector Private sector Finance sector** Academia **Law enforcement Incident Response SMEs** NGOs Non-profit organisations

Challenges in Managing Ransomware

Policy Recommendations



Governance



Criminal infrastructure



Incident response capacity



Cyber Insurance



Legislation and law enforcement



Trust and collaboration



Certification schemes



Societal impact



Skills and training



Build effective partnerships for ransomware defence



Cluster 2

Develop a communitybased resilience architecture



Cluster 3


Uplift cybersecurity skills and capacity



Cluster 4

Define a regulatory response to ransomware





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